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SUSTAINABLILITY OF GROWTH IN THE KOREAN
MANUFACTURING SECTOR
This paper examines Krugman’s pessimistic paradigm on East Asian economic growth,
using Korean manufacturing data. The initial focus is on a disaggregated growth accounting
approach. I found that productivity growth is the largest contributor to output growth in
eight of fifteen industries, and that productivity growth explains about 38 per cent of output
growth of manufacturing overall. Secondly the theoretical issues, which call into question
the theoretical basis of the paradigm, are examined. I found that sequencing of the sources
of growth was empirically verified (productivity growth in light industries → capital
accumulation in heavy and petrochemical industries → productivity growth through R&D
efforts), and that an increasing or constant output–capital ratio (marginal product of capital)
was found in ten of the fifteen industries, and that interactions between productivity growth
and capital input growth were found in nine of the fifteen industries. These results give a
strong indication that criticism of the sustainability of East Asian growth is open to question.
Introduction
The remarkable economic performance in the East Asian NIEs (newly industrialising
economies) over the past three decades has been an important issue in the literature on
economic growth in recent years. During the past three decades, NIEs have recorded the
world’s highest growth rates. Growth accounting exercises have been carried out to identify
the reason for the high growth in this region, with the expectation that high productivity
growth would provide the answer. However, the results show that this is not the case. Instead,
these studies arrived at the consensus that resource mobilisation rather than productivity
growth was the main source of economic growth in the region. (Young 1992, 1994, 1995; Kim
and Lau 1994; Collins and Bosworth 1996). Krugman (1994) concludes that growth in the
NIEs is unsustainable, comparing them with former Soviet Russia, which experienced a
dramatic slowdown after remarkable growth fuelled by capital mobilisation. He argues that
East Asian economies will also inevitably experience a slowdown because of a lack of
productivity gains. This low productivity growth, when combined with the view that
disembodied technological change driven by innovation is the main contributor to long-run
growth, implies that NIEs will not be able to achieve sustainable growth in the long run.
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The logic of judging whether growth is sustainable or not is based on two theoretical
assumptions: that disembodied technological change driven by R&D efforts is the sole source
of long-run growth; and that growth accounting techniques are correct to measure technologi-
cal change as productivity growth.
These earlier empirical findings and their implication of unsustainable growth may not
be robust. First, highly aggregated data are used to calculate productivity growth, with
resultant aggregation bias. An aggregate production function approach can be justified only
if all sectoral production functions are identical (Jorgenson 1990). Second, capital stock data
are unreliable because they are constructed from historical investment data using simplistic
and arbitrary assumptions (Sarel 1995). Third, some studies using the production function
estimation technique are unreliable because of their assumption that the weights of inputs
are constant over time. This paper seeks to overcome these problems by employing a
disaggregated standard growth accounting approach and by using capital stock data
constructed directly from surveys. Then the robustness of the previous findings and their
pessimistic conclusion are tested to confirm whether or not the use of disaggregated data gives
different results.
Recent theoretical developments in this area have produced some valuable insights into
the puzzle of low productivity gains in the East Asian NIEs. These include ideas about
sequencing of the sources of output growth, interactions between capital formation and
technological change, and the effect of structural adjustment on productivity growth. Lau
(1996) hypotheses that the sources of output growth change according to the stage of
development; capital accumulation is the main source of economic growth in the early stages
of development. Later, disembodied technological change becomes a more important source
of growth. Landau (1989, 1992) hypothesises that there are interactions between capital
formation and technological change, so that capital accumulation can be a major source of
long-term growth in transitional (or catching-up) economies. These hypotheses successfully
explain why high growth in the NIEs is explained by capital accumulation rather than
productivity growth, and lead to the argument that technological change has played a
significant role in the high growth in this region. If these hypotheses can be verified
empirically, the argument that East Asian growth is unsustainable may be open to question.
I examine these three issues in the later part of this paper using Korean manufacturing data.
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The next section reviews the empirical findings of growth accounting studies and their
implications for sustainability of growth and reviews the theoretical hypotheses which
explain the reasons for low productivity gains. This section questions the logic of judging
whether or not growth is sustainable on the basis that disembodied technological change
driven by R&D efforts is the sole source of long-run growth, and that capital and technology
are independent of each other. The third section tests the validity of the aggregate production
function approach, accounts for sources of growth at the disaggregated level, and evaluates
Krugman’s hypothesis under the standard growth accounting framework. Section 4 tests the
theoretical hypotheses that undermine Krugman’s hypothesis. The final section summarises
the findings and draws some conclusions.
Literature survey: empirical findings and theoretical issues
Resource mobilisation rather than productivity growth
Earlier studies, involving both the growth accounting approach and the convergence ap-
proach, arrive at the consensus that economic growth in the NIEs was not significantly based
upon productivity growth, and that capital accumulation (convergence in capital intensity)
played the crucial role in the rapid growth of NIEs. Kim and Lau (1994) and Pack (1993, 1992)
suggest that the total factor productivity (TFP) gap between developed and developing
countries actually widened in the course of East Asia’s rapid economic growth.
Young (1995) undertakes the most thorough growth accounting study of growth in the
NIEs (see Table 1). The contribution of TFP to the output growth of each country is 31.5 per
cent in Hong Kong, 27.7 per cent in Taiwan, 16.5 per cent in Korea, and 2.3 per cent in
Singapore, while the contribution of capital is 40.8 per cent, 33.6 per cent, 37.2 per cent and
64.9 per cent, respectively. Based on these results, Young concludes that ‘with the exception
of Singapore, productivity growth in the NICs is not particularly low, it is also, by postwar
standards, not extraordinarily high’ (Young 1995: 671).
Young’s empirical finding has had a strong influence on recent studies of long-run
growth and the question of sustainability. However, the applicability of his findings to the
question of sustainability is somewhat problematic from this perspective. First, his finding
is based on a highly aggregated study rather than disaggregated data. As Jorgenson et al.
(1987) have established, productivity calculations based on an aggregate production function
can be misleading if aggregation bias exists. The aggregate approach requires very stringent
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Table 1 Total factor productivity growth in NIEs (per cent)
Time Period Output Capital Labour Labour share TFP
Hong Kong 66–91 7.3 8.0 (40.8) 3.2 (27.5) 0.628 2.3 (31.5)
Singapore 66–90 8.7 11.5 (64.9) 5.7 (33.3) 0.509 0.2 (2.3)
70–90 8.5 11.2 (78.5) 7.0 (33.3) 0.404 -1.0(-11.8)
Korea 66–90 10.3 12.9 (37.2) 6.4 (43.7) 0.703 1.7 (16.5)
14.1 15.1 (51.3) 7.4 (27.3) 0.521 3.0 (18.4)
Taiwan 66–90 9.4 12.3 (33.6) 4.9 (38.7) 0.743 2.6 (27.7)
10.8 13.0 (50.7) 6.3 (33.8) 0.579 1.7 (15.7)
Notes: 1 The values of the upper line in each cell represent whole economies. But in the case of Korea and
Taiwan, these values represent the non-agricultural sector.
2 The values of lower line in each cell represent the manufacturing sector.
3 The values in parentheses represent the contribution of factor to output growth.
Source: Tables V, VI, VII, VIII in Young (1995).
assumptions about production patterns at the level of individual sectors of the economy.
Intuitively speaking, the technology of each sector must be a replica of the aggregate
production function. Section 3 examines whether Young’s finding is robust in respect of this
bias by analysing the sources of growth at an industry level.
The second issue affecting the robustness of Young’s finding is the possibility that stage
of development or industrial structure strongly affects productivity performance in the case
of follower countries. According to Dowrick (1995) and Drysdale and Huang (1995), labour
productivity at the initial stage explains about one-third of the variation in subsequent rates
of growth. This means that productivity performance in a developing country diverges
according to the stage of development. Measured productivity of a country may also depend
on the industrial structure. According to Table 1, the higher the labour share, the higher the
TFP growth. If higher labour intensity resulting from labour-intensive industrial structure
leads to higher TFP growth and higher TFP contribution to growth, TFP may not be a good
indicator of the technology level of a country, contrary to the expectations of the growth
accounting theorists.
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Convergence of per capita income but no convergence of TFP level
Much of the literature on convergence verifies empirically that developed countries exhibit
TFP catch-up as well as a convergence in labour productivity (per capita income), particularly
after the Second World War. Convergence proponents also make efforts to extend the
convergence argument to NIEs. However, there is wide consensus that TFP catch-up did not
occur, even though convergence in per capita income (Y/L) is evident among developing
countries (Dollar and Sokoloff 1990; Dollar 1991; De Long and Summers 1993).
Dollar (1991) and Dollar and Sokoloff (1990) account for the sources of labour
productivity (Y/L) in the Korean manufacturing sector. Dollar (1991) verifies that Korean
labour productivity (Y/L) converges towards the German level, with capital deepening (K/
L) and TFP accounting for two-thirds, and one-third of labour productivity convergence,
respectively. However, the source of convergence differs greatly across industries. For heavy
industries, capital deepening is the sole source of the labour productivity convergence,1
whereas for light industries, TFP convergence is the sole source.2  For this reason, Dollar
emphasises that the employment structure of Korean manufacturing changed from heavy
industry to light industry over the period under review (1963–79), promoting TFP conver-
gence at an aggregated level. However, Korea’s industrial structure changed in the opposite
direction from the mid-1970s, contrary to Dollar’s prediction. The continuous change in the
competitiveness of Korean manufacturing from light industries to heavy industries shifted
manufacturing production continuously towards heavy industry in the 1980s and 1990s. This
trend and the empirical finding of almost zero productivity growth in heavy industry lead to
the conclusion that TFP catch-up did not occur, even though convergence in labour produc-
tivity was evident, contrary to his expectation of catch-up.3  The empirical finding of TFP
convergence in these two studies does not appear to be robust.4
The fragility of the findings of Dollar, and Dollar and Sokoloff shows the limitations of
standard TFP calculations, which ignore the technological characteristics of particular
industries and so fail to identify real technological change. Dollar and Sokoloff (1990) argue
that the main source of TFP convergence in Korean manufacturing is ‘scale economies
associated with the transition from craft to modern labor-intensive production’. This finding
well describes the characteristic of manufacturing growth in the 1960s and early 1970s, when
light industry products, such as textiles, toys, wigs and plywoods, were key export goods.
However, their finding is not valid after capital-intensive industries replaced labour-
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intensive industries. There was a different mechanism for output growth and productivity
growth, lowering standard productivity growth. If different stages of development and/or
industrial structure (labour intensity) lead to different productivity growth, as shown in
Young (1994), any international comparison of TFP performance will be seriously biased.
Sustainability of growth in NIEs
The earlier empirical work in both growth accounting and convergence studies concluded that
economic growth in the NIEs was not based on exceptionally strong productivity growth, and
that capital deepening played a crucial role. Standard neoclassical growth theory predicts
that capital deepening will not allow sustained growth to continue since long-run growth can
only be achieved by technological change. Thus, combining the earlier empirical findings with
neoclassical theory leads to a pessimistic prediction about the sustainability of growth in the
NIEs because it was a remarkable mobilisation of factors (in particular capital) rather than
productivity growth that was the main contributor to rapid growth in East Asia (Krugman
1994).
Krugman (1994) compares the growth performance of NIEs with that of former Soviet
Russia. Soviet Russia experienced strong growth in the 1950s and 1960s but growth declined
dramatically in the 1970s and 1980s because of a lack of technological change. He warns that
the ‘little dragons’ may turn out to be ‘paper tigers’. The question I raise above on aggregation
bias is expected to weaken Krugman’s pessimistic logic. I test this hypothesis by examining
the role of productivity growth in output growth at a disaggregated level in Section 3. Any
relationship between industrial structure or stage of development and productivity growth
also weakens the pessimistic view of the sustainability of growth. I examine this question in
Section 4.
Sequencing of sources of output growth
A key idea is that the main sources of output growth change according to the stage of
development. Physical and human capital accumulation is the main source of economic
growth in the early stages of development. Later, disembodied technical progress (innovation
activity by R&D efforts) becomes the main source of economic growth. Recently the
sequencing issue has again attracted interest. Lau (1996) argues:
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Much of the economic growth in the United States in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries can be similarly [with NIEs now] explained by the
growth in tangible capital and labor inputs. Technical progress was not found
to be a significant source of U.S. economic growth until the studies of Abramobitz
(1956) and Solow (1957) for the period starting in the late 1920s. The same was
also true of the Japanese experience. We may therefore reasonably draw the
conclusion that physical (or tangible) capital accumulation is most important
for countries at an initial phase of economic development.
Lau is the first formally to hypothesise the idea of the sequencing of physical capital, human
capital and technical progress in the process of a country’s economic growth.5  Based on the
earlier empirical findings, he explains the hypothesis of the sequencing of the sources of
output growth as follows:
After a certain level of capital intensity has been reached, diminishing marginal
productivity of physical capital will inevitably set in, given that land and
natural resources are fixed and the labor input can grow only slowly. When that
happens, the desirability of intangible capital will increase relative to that of
tangible capital; this preference is further reinforced by the complementarity
between tangible and intangible capital, which requires a minimum level of the
former for the latter to be productive. Technical progress can therefore be
expected to assume increasing importance as an economy is transformed from
developing to developed status. There is thus a time sequence — with physical
capital accumulation being the most important source of economic growth in the
initial phase and technical progress assuming an increasingly significant role
in the mature phase, after sufficient capital accumulation has taken place. To
this extent, technical progress may be considered to be endogenous in the
aggregate.
The hypothesis successfully explains why capital accumulation rather than productivity
growth was the main source of growth in the NIEs. These economies have yet to emerge from
the earlier stage in which innovative technological change is not important. This hypothesis
also questions the logic of judging whether or not growth is sustainable on the basis that
disembodied technological change driven by R&D efforts is the sole source of long-run growth.
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This view implies that economic growth driven by capital accumulation does not necessarily
lead to a significant future decline in growth, even though it is the sole source of output growth
in the early stage of development. In this respect, Krugman’s pessimism about the sustainability
of growth may be misleading. I validate this hypothesis using Korean manufacturing data in
Section 4.
Interaction between capital formation and technical progress
Neoclassical theory and the growth accounting method assume that (physical and human)
capital and technology are independent of one another, constituting separate and independ-
ent contributors to economic growth. Some economists, however, have raised doubts about
this assumption (Landau 1989, 1992; Hulten 1975, 1979).
There are two ways in which the interaction between technological change and capital
formation occurs. One possibility is the embodiment effect (from capital formation to
technological change); technology is embodied in new capital, so capital formation induces
technological change. Recently the so-called Stanford technology school (Boskin, Lau, and
Kim) has emphasised the embodiment effect, based on the finding of meta-production
function studies that approximately 80 per cent of technological change in OECD countries
is embodied rather than disembodied. Boskin, cited in Landau (1989; 1992), illustrates this
possibility (see Figure 1). Suppose that an economy is at point A at t0, and that pro-investment
policy leads to a higher capital formation and a transition to a higher level of income.
Neoclassical theory suggests that the economy arrives at point B at time t1, where the economy
returns to a long-run growth path (2). However, if there is an interaction between technology
and capital formation, there is a possibility that the economy follows path (3), and a higher
growth rate than the former long-run growth rate, instead of path (2). I test this hypothesis
in Section 4. Capital stock data in Section 3 are estimated without considering the
embodiment effect. Thus, a positive correlation should be observed between the productivity
growth rate and the growth rate of capital input, if the embodiment effect exists (Wolff 1991).
The other possibility is induced technological change (from technological change to
capital formation); whereby technological change increases capital formation. In this case,
capital accumulation appears to have almost no independent role in determining economic
growth. Using Figure 2, Hulten argues that the real effect of technical progress is the sum of
the shift in the production function plus induced capital accumulation.
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(1)
(2)
(3)
Figure 1 Alternative growth paths: technological change and capital
formation
Source: Figure 12.2 in Landau (1989: 487).
Assume that there is a production function that relates capital per unit labor
to output per unit labor. And let us assume that the economy is at some point
A where labor force ‘growth’ is static and investment is just enough to keep the
capital stock intact...Suppose that a new technology is introduced that causes
the production function to shift. The multifactor productivity residual will now
show a positive growth rate...Under the standard growth accounting story, we
would measure the importance of multifactor productivity as a source of
economic growth by the shift in the production function A to B. But we should
also notice that this shift results in additional output per person and that the
additional output will result in extra saving...The extra saving will result in
more capital per worker, so the economy moves along the production function.
This extra capital generates still more saving and capital, which generates still
more output, etc. The economy will come to rest at some point C at which
depreciation of large capital stock just equals the additional saving. The
contribution of the initial shift in the production function is therefore not the
B
A
Y
L
λ
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distance A to B; it is really the vertical distance between A and C (the segment
AD). That is, all of the economic growth that occurs as the economy moves from
A to C is due to technical change, qua shift in the production function. The
conventional growth accounting story, on the other hand, would erroneously say
that BD/AD per cent of total change in output per worker is due to capital, and
AB/AD is due to technical change. (cited in Landau 1989: 488–9)
Source: Figure 12-3 in Landau (1989: 489).
This hypothesis also successfully explains the reason for low productivity gains in the NIEs.
Moreover, it undermines the logic of judging whether growth is sustainable or unsustainable.
According to growth accounting methodology, capital and technology are independent of each
other, and measured productivity growth, by definition, represents technological change. If
capital accumulation has a technological component, measured productivity growth may not
be equivalent to real technological change. For this reason, productivity growth may
underestimate the role of technological change. I also test this hypothesis in Section 4.
Figure 2 Induced technological change
D C
A
B
measured by standard growth accounting
new production
function
existing production
function
total effect
of techno-
logical
change
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Disaggregated growth accounting study
This section seeks to account for the sources of output growth in Korean manufacturing at the
disaggregated level, and considers whether or not the earlier findings are valid in a
disaggregated industry study. It also tests the sustainability of growth, employing the criteria
used by Krugman.
Growth accounting framework
In this section a hybrid of Denison and Jorgenson’s framework is constructed, combining the
merits of both. Such a model would view productivity growth as a fundamental source of
growth on the one hand, and allow the disaggregated approach, where resource reallocation
is a component of productivity growth in aggregating procedure. The basic strategies are as
follows. First, following Jorgenson’s disaggregation procedure, the manufacturing sector as
a whole is disaggregated into 15 industries, and the sources of growth in each industry are
calculated. This strategy avoids the danger of aggregation bias, and gives detailed informa-
tion of productivity growth at the industry level. It also makes it possible to test Krugman’s
hypothesis at the disaggregated level.
Second, following Denison’s argument on sustainable and unsustainable factors, I shall
not consider embodied technological change and quality change of capital as a component of
capital input in the growth accounting framework. They are viewed as components of
productivity growth. This strategy makes this study comparable to others, leading to answers
about the sustainability question using a standard approach. It also guarantees relatively
higher productivity growth than Jorgenson, leaving economies of scale, quality change of
capital and others in productivity growth.
I define the sectoral growth rate of productivity for each individual industry, and
express the aggregate productivity growth of aggregate manufacturing. In addition I explore
the aggregation procedure across all industries, while clarifying the relationship between
aggregate productivity growth and growth rates of sectoral productivity.
Suppose that T is time, V is the output, K, L are the capital and labour inputs, and that
{PiV}, {P
i
K}, {P
i
L} denote the prices of outputs, and capital and labour inputs, respectively. If
we consider data at any two discrete points of time, say T and T-1, the average rates of sectoral
productivity growth {viT}, translog rates of productivity growth, can be expressed as follows:
12
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(1) viT = [ln Vi(T) - ln Vi(T-1)] - v
i
K [ln Ki(T) - ln Ki(T-1)]
                                       - viL [ln Li(T) - ln Li(T-1)]                  (i = 1, 2,…, 15),
where viK = 0.5[v
i
K(T) + v
i
K(T-1)], v
i
K = P
i
K Ki / P
i
V Vi,
viL = 0.5[v
i
L(T) + v
i
L(T-1)], v
i
L = P
i
L Li/ P
i
V Vi and v
i
T = 0.5[v
i
T(T) + v
i
T(T-1)].
Similarly, we can write the average rate of aggregate productivity growth in terms of the
growth rates of aggregate output, aggregate capital and labour inputs as follows:
(2) vT = [ln V(T) - ln V(T-1)] - vK [ln K(T) - ln K(T-1)]
                    - vL [ln L(T) - ln L(T-1)
where V = S Vi, K = S Ki, L = S Li, vK = 0.5×[vK(T) + vK(T-1)],
vL = 0.5×[vL(T) + vL(T-1)], vK = PK K / PV V, vL = PL L / PV V.
According to Jorgenson, conditions for producer equilibrium at the sectoral and aggregate
levels are equivalent only under the restrictive conditions that there exist for all sectors value-
added functions that are identical to the aggregate production function, that capital and
labour inputs within each sector are identical functions of their components, and that the
prices paid for primary factor inputs are the same for all sectors. To test the validity of the
aggregate production function approach, Jorgenson derives a relationship between aggregate
productivity growth and the weighted sum of sectoral productivity growth (WSSP) as follows.
Multiplying equation (1) by the ratio of value-added in the corresponding sector to value-
added in all sectors, and summing over all sectors, we obtain
(3) Swi×viT = Sw
i [ln Vi(T) - ln Vi(T-1)] - Sw
i×viK [ln Ki(T) - ln Ki(T-1)]
                            - Swi×viL [ln Li(T) - ln Li(T-1)],                (i = 1, 2,…, 15),
where wi = 0.5 [wi(T) + wi(T-1)], wi = P
i
VVi / S P
i
VVi.
Subtracting equation (3) from equation (2) and rearranging, we arrive at the rate of
productivity growth for the aggregate manufacturing sector.
13
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(4) vT = Sw
i×viT
        - Swi [ln Vi(T) - ln Vi(T-1)] + [ln V(T) - ln V(T-1)]
        + Swi×viK [ln Ki(T) - ln Ki(T-1)] - vK [ln K(T) - ln K(T-1)]
        + Swi×viL [ln Li(T) - ln Li(T-1)] - vL [ln L(T) - ln L(T-1)],   (i = 1, 2,…, 15).
Equation (4) shows that aggregate productivity growth can be defined as the sum of a
weighted sum of sectoral productivity growths and three resource reallocations. According to
Jorgenson, aggregate productivity growth has a meaning only when the sums of the
reallocations of value-added, capital, and labour are near zero. If they are markedly different
from zero, we cannot define an aggregate production function, by definition.
Data
I employ the growth accounting data of Hong and Kim (1996) (KDI data hereafter), which are
an extension study of Kim and Hong (1992), Kim and Park (1985) and Kim and Park (1988),
because the dataset is consistent with my strategies for a growth accounting framework. They
account for the sources of growth of 36 industries in the Korean manufacturing sector over
the 1967–93 period. They include intermediate input as a factor of production, following
Jorgenson, but calculate sources of growth with the extension of Denison’s methodology. The
KDI data are consistent with Denison’s framework; for example, capital and labour input
data are calculated using Denison’s approach.
Capital stock data are calculated as the sum of total fixed assets (non-residential
structures and equipment plus land), weighted by 0.75, and inventories, weighted by 0.25.
Inclusion of land and inventories decreases the growth rate in capital stock because land and
inventories have grown more slowly than equipment and non-residential structures. Data for
each component of capital stock are constructed using the National Wealth Survey and Mining
and Manufacturing Survey; benchmark data of 1968, 1978 and 1987 are from the National
Wealth Survey and Mining and Manufacturing Survey data are used to construct the time
series. The capital stock data in this study are more reliable than those constructed from the
historical investment data of the National Account, because they do not require arbitrary
assumptions about depreciation rate and reference period used for extrapolation.
The labour input index is calculated by multiplying the total employment index, which
includes self employment as well as unpaid family workers, by the index of monthly labour
14
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hours and the index of quality change in labour.6  It is impossible to get collect labour quality
change data at the industry level. So Hong and Kim (1996), Kim and Hong (1992) and Kim
and Park (1985) use the labour quality change data of the whole economy in all the industries
at the same time. The KDI labour input data are not weighted by age–sex profile. A one-to-
one rule is applied in treating self-employed and unpaid family workers, which grow more
slowly than normal employment. Thus, the growth rate in the labour input index is lower than
other cases.
Aggregated results and validity of the aggregate production function
approach
The aggregate growth accounting results are summarised in Table 2. During the period 1967–
93, the contribution to growth rates7 of capital and labour are 7.9 per cent and 2.3 per cent,
respectively. The contributions of productivity growth, capital, and labour to output growth
are 36.9 per cent, 49.1 per cent, and 14.1 per cent, respectively. These results confirm the
earlier findings that capital deepening plays a major role in rapid output growth; capital
deepening explains 49.1 per cent of the output growth of Korean manufacturing. However,
this study also suggests that productivity growth is a significant contributor to output growth.
A 6.0 per cent productivity growth and a 36.9 per cent contribution ratio are not low when
compared with the values of developed countries in the same period. This conclusion is very
similar to Drysdale and Huang (1995), who argue against Krugman that ‘although increases
in factor inputs were significant contributors to growth of output in East Asian economies,
productivity growth was also an important factor contributing to rapid growth’.
Table 3 decomposes aggregate productivity growth in the Korean manufacturing sector
into the weighted sum of sectoral productivity growth (WSSP) and resource reallocations of
value-added, capital input, and labour input, using equation (4). Table 3 shows that the sums
of resource reallocations are not far from zero over the whole period. However, the sum of
resource reallocations by time period (the last column in the table) leads to a different
conclusion. The sum of resource reallocations is quite different from zero during the 1968–73,
1973–78, and 1978–83 sub-periods, though not in the 1983–88 and 1988–93 periods These
results suggest that the aggregate production function approach is not valid for the first three
periods, and that the validity of the approach over the whole period is spurious. It also means
that the sum of sectoral productivity growth weighted by industry share is a better measure
15
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of aggregate productivity growth. Further, it indicates that diversification across industries
(entering into new industries sequentially) is a prominent source of productivity growth in
the first three periods. Aggregation bias disappears after the early 1980s, reflecting the
exhaustion of opportunities for productivity growth by diversification across industries.
Thus, the earlier aggregate growth accounting studies such as Young (1995) and Kim and Lau
(1994) are somewhat misleading because the aggregate production function up until the early
1980s cannot be defined. This calls their findings into question.
Table 2 Growth in aggregate output and its sources (per cent)
68–73 73–78 78–83 83–88 88–93 68–93
Growth rate
  Value-added 20.85 20.59 12.07 15.43 12.15 16.14
  Productivity 10.36   6.53   2.49   5.57   4.80   5.95
  Capital   7.02 10.56   8.62   7.62   6.13   7.92
  Labour   3.48   3.50   0.96   2.24   1.22   2.27
Contribution
  Value-added 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
  Productivity 49.67 31.72 20.64 36.08 39.52 36.87
  Capital 33.65 51.28 71.41 49.38 50.42 49.07
  Labour 16.68 17.00   7.95 14.54 10.06 14.06
Capital share 61.62 62.15 60.61 59.83 57.08 60.23
Table 3 Aggregate productivity growth and its components, 1968–93 (per cent)
68–73 73–78 78–83 83–88 88–93 68–93
Aggregate prod. growth
(A+B+C+D) 10.35 6.55 2.50 5.58 4.83 5.96
WSSP (A) 11.66 7.16 3.83 5.35 4.69 6.45
Output reallocation (B) -1.93 -0.46 -1.77 0.05 0.04 -0.74
Capital reallocation (C) 0.48 -0.65 -0.18 -0.16 0.10 -0.07
Labour reallocation (D) 0.15 0.50 0.61 0.35 0.00 0.33
Sum of reallocations
(B+C+D) -1.30 -0.61 -1.34 0.23 0.14 -0.49
Source: Author’s calculations.
Source: Author’s calculations.
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Do these results really mean that the opportunities for productivity growth through
diversification are over? Note that follower countries have other opportunities to enhance
productivity growth, namely by moving into production of high-quality products within the
same industries. This study does not capture within-industry effects because more disaggre-
gation is required. This study simply captures the effects of expanding production activities
over industries (across-industry effects). For example, the framework has the power to
identify structural adjustment from labour-intensive to capital-intensive industries (heavy
and petrochemical industrialisation), but has no power to identify a production shift from 4M
DRAMs to 16M DRAMs. This kind of structural adjustment has been more common than
entering new industries since the 1980s. To detect this kind of industrial deepening effect, far
more disaggregated data are needed.
Disaggregated results and sustainability of growth
Table 4 summarises the growth accounting results of 15 integrated industries which are
based on the two-input model. According to the table, productivity growth is the largest
contributor to output growth in eight industries: textiles, clothes and leather, wood, paper and
printing, chemicals, fabricated metals and machinery, office machinery and medical/preci-
sion instruments, motor vehicles, and transportation vehicles except motor vehicles. Krugman’s
hypothesis is debatable for these industries. Four other industries show that productivity
growth is an important source of growth. Their productivity contribution ratios are over 33
per cent. In contrast, capital is the dominant contributor in four industries: food, beverages
and tobacco, refined petroleum, steel and non-ferrous metals, and electrical and electronic
products. Krugman’s criticism is valid only in these industries. In the case of Korean
manufacturing, productivity growth can explain output growth to such an extent that we can
reject the unsustainable growth hypothesis.
Empirical results surrounding theoretical issues
The disaggregated growth accounting study in Section 3 found that productivity growth was
an important contributor to output growth in Korea’s manufacturing sector. Nevertheless, it
is apparent that capital accumulation played the major role in Korea’s rapid economic growth,
confirming the earlier empirical findings of the aggregated studies. Why is high growth in the
NIEs explained by capital accumulation rather than productivity growth? Does this necessar-
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ily mean that technological change has played a minor role in the high growth in this region?
The aim of this section is to understand the puzzle of low productivity gains in NIEs. The
sources of output growth are not independent of the stage of industrialisation through which
an economy is passing. Nor is the rate of technological change independent of the role of capital
accumulation, as the discussion in Section 2 suggested. This section tests two hypotheses
about these relationships, using Korean data, and examines why productivity has been so
high in Korea’s manufacturing sector.
Table 4 Growth in sectoral output and its sources, 1968–93
growth rate contribution
output product- capital labour product- capital labour
ivity ivity
Food, beverage, tobacco 12.12 4.04 7.48 0.61 33.31 61.66 5.03
Textiles 14.60 7.03 5.71 1.85 48.19 39.12 12.69
Clothes, leather 12.73 5.69 4.69 2.35 44.72 36.84 18.45
Wood, paper, printing 12.87 6.12 4.48 2.27 47.54 34.82 17.64
Chemicals 21.12 10.07 8.45 2.60 47.68 40.00 12.32
Refined petroleum 13.05 2.67 10.09 0.29 20.42 77.32 2.25
Rubber, plastic 17.63 6.70 7.44 3.49 38.03 42.19 19.78
Non-metallic minerals 14.29 4.84 7.36 2.10 33.83 51.51 14.66
Steel, non-ferrous metals 20.43 5.95 11.63 2.85 29.12 56.91 13.97
Machinery, fabricated metals 19.41 8.06 6.66 4.69 41.53 34.33 24.14
Office, medical machinery 25.11 10.49 8.20 6.42 41.77 32.67 25.56
Electrical/electronic products 23.95 6.05 12.44 5.46 25.26 51.93 22.81
Motor vehicles 22.28 9.13 9.12 4.04 40.95 40.92 18.14
Other vehicles 19.71 9.88 6.16 3.67 50.13 31.23 18.64
Others 14.10 5.07 5.72 3.30 35.98 40.59 23.43
Source: Author’s calculations.
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Sequencing of sources of output growth
Lau (1996) hypotheses that the sources of output growth change according to the stage of
development: capital accumulation is the main source of economic growth in the earlier stages
of development, then disembodied technological change (through R&D investment) becomes
more important. Following Dollar and Sokoloff (1990) and Dollar (1991), I hypothesise that
productivity growth is the main source of growth at the initial stage of development, reflecting
the transition to modern labour-intensive production, before capital accumulation becomes
the major contributor to growth. Hence, productivity growth (through the introduction of the
modern factory system), capital growth, and then productivity growth (through R&D
investment) would be the major sources of growth, in that sequence. I test this modified
version of the hypothesis, and use it as an explanation for the puzzle of low productivity gains.
Figure 3 shows the contribution ratios of productivity and capital growth to output
growth over the period. The major source of output growth appears to have changed over time.
Productivity growth is the major source of growth in the first stage of growth (1968–73).
Capital deepening is the major source of growth in the second stage (1973–78 and 1978–83).
Figure 3 Sources of growth in the manufacturing sector, 1968–93 (per cent)
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Capital deepening plays the major role in growth but the role of productivity growth increases
in 1983–88 and 1988–93.8  Figure 3 confirms that the experiences of Korea’s manufacturing
sector are consistent with the hypothesis of sequencing of the sources of growth, and that the
manufacturing sector is in a period of transition from the second to the third stage, where
innovation is the sole source of technological change.
The hypothesis is also validated in the industry-level analysis. Sequencing of the major
sources of growth is identified in most of the disaggregated industries. Quite different trends
are seen in clothes and leather, wood, paper and printing, rubber and plastic and electrical
and electronic products, which are characterised by major changes in product items within
the same classification.
Figure 3 reveals that productivity growth is the major contributor to output growth in
1968–73. This is consistent with the findings of Dollar and Sokoloff (1990) and Dollar (1991)
that productivity catch-up occurred in labour-intensive industries in Korea, even though this
was not the case in the second stage (1973–83) and the third transition period (1983–93), when
the share of light industry in total output decreased. The second stage is characterised by
capital deepening and poor performance in productivity growth, as Young (1995) and Lau and
Kim (1994) argue. But their finding is not valid for the first stage, when productivity growth
was the major contributor to growth. In the last period, capital input growth and capital
contribution gradually decreased while productivity contribution increased gradually, as
observed by Lau (1996) and economic historians. Perhaps the next period (the third stage of
development), when all the opportunities for faster growth for a follower country are
exhausted and innovation activity is the sole source of technological change, will confirm with
the neoclassical prediction that productivity growth through R&D efforts is the major source
of output growth.
This hypothesis successfully explains why capital accumulation rather than productiv-
ity growth was the major source of growth in the NIEs. These economies have yet to graduate
from the earlier stages of growth in which innovation by R&D investment is not the only
method of technological change. This hypothesis challenges the criticism that poor produc-
tivity performance in NIEs means that they will be unable to sustain growth. For example,
though capital accumulation is the sole source of output growth in the earlier stages of growth,
in particular in the second stage, this does not necessarily imply that growth will show a
significant decline in the future.
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Interaction between capital growth and productivity growth
In the literature survey in Section 2 I hypothesised that there may be interaction between
capital growth and technological change: embodied9 and induced technological change. I test
this hypothesis employing a Granger causality test to clarify the direction of the interaction
between the two.10
I test whether there is causality between productivity growth and capital input growth
in a bivariate environment.11  Capital input growth (productivity growth) is said to Granger-
cause productivity growth (capital input growth) if productivity growth can be forecast better
using past productivity growth (capital input growth) and past capital input growth
(productivity growth), rather than just productivity growth. Causality from capital to
productivity growth supports the embodied technological change hypothesis, whereas causal-
ity in the opposite direction supports the induced technological change hypothesis.
To test whether X Granger-causes Y, we run two regressions: equation (5) and (6).
(5) Y = Σ αiYt-i + Σ βj Xt-j + εt
(6) Y = Σ αiYt-i + εt
Then, the hypothesis that β1 = β2 =…= βj = 0 is tested, using the F statistic. The number of
lags of Y is determined by correlogram, and that of X is determined by Akaike–Schwartz
criteria.12
Table 5 reports the results. Causality from capital growth to productivity growth is
found in chemical and chemical products (three-factor model only), refined petroleum, non-
metallic minerals, office machinery and medical/precision instruments, electrical and elec-
tronic products, and motor vehicles at the 10 per cent significance level. This implies that
capital input growth causes the increase in productivity growth (embodied technological
change). Causality in the opposite direction is found in food, beverages, and tobacco (three-
factor model only), textiles, wood, paper and publishing, rubber and plastic, steel and non-
ferrous metals, machinery and fabricated metals (three-factor model only), office machinery
and medical/precision instruments, electrical and electronic products (two-factor model
only), other transportation vehicles, and other manufacturing at the 10 per cent significance
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Table 5 Interaction between capital and productivity growth (Granger
causality test)
                                      2-factor model                               3-factor model
K→TFP TFP→K K→TFP TFP→K
F stat F stat F stat F stat
(sig. level, %) (sig. level, %) (sig. level, %) (sig. level, %)
Food, beverages, tobacco 2.0 (16.8) 1.2 (38.1) 2.2 (15.1) 2.7 (8.5)*
Textiles 1.7 (22.7) 3.4 (6.3)* 1.7 (25.9) 3.4 (6.2)*
Clothes and leather 1.0 (46.4) 1.6 (25.2) 1.5 (24.8) 0.1 (77.8)
Wood, paper and publishing 1.2 (34.3) 3.1 (5.3)* 1.2 (34.7) 2.8 (6.7)*
Chemical and chemical
products 2.1 (12.0) 2.0 (14.3) 2.4 (9.0)* 2.2 (11.8)
Refined petroleum 2.7 (6.5)* 0.8 (53.1) 2.5 (8.8)* 1.5 (25.9)
Rubber and plastic 0.4 (86.8) 7.3 (0.5)** 0.4 (90.0) 5.2 (3.2)**
Non-metallic minerals 9.1 (0.3)** 0.2 (65.1) 5.9 (1.1)** 0.2 (63.3)
Steel and non-ferrous metals 0.5 (47.6) 2.8 (6.6)* 12.5 (0.1)** 3.2 (5.9)*
Machinery and fabricated
metals 1.7 (21.3) 1.6 (25.7) 1.7 (20.6) 3.0 (4.9)**
Office machinery, medical,
precision instruments 6.3 (0.9)** 8.0 (0.4)** 5.9 (1.1)** 7.4 (0.5)**
Electrical and electronic
products 12.0 (0.1)** 9.7 (0.0)** 12.5 (0.1)** 2.0 (16.8)
Motor vehicles 2.4 (9.1)* 0.7 (65.6) 2.3 (9.7)* 1.4 (27.7)
Other transportation vehicles 0.8 (62.0) 6.2 (2.1)** 0.7 (68.2) 9.1 (0.3)**
Other manufacturing 0.8 (37.0) 2.6 (9.7)* 0.9 (34.3) 4.6 (4.2)**
Aggregate 3.4 (5.0)** 1.3 (35.0) 3.4 (5.0)** 1.3 (35.0)
Source: Author’s calculations.
level. This implies that productivity growth causes the increase in capital input growth
(induced technological change).
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The causality test is not valid when a third variable causes increases in both capital
input and productivity growth. Kim and Hong (1992) and Hong and Kim (1996) find the
strongest relationship between productivity growth and output growth. To eliminate this
bias, we also test the causalities running from output growth to productivity growth on the
one hand and to capital input growth on the other. According to Table A1, industries such as
rubber and plastic, machinery and fabricated metals, office machinery and medical/precision
instruments, and other manufacturing support the third variable bias possibility. This means
the idea that embodied or induced technological change is verified in these four industries (in
Table 5) is spurious. Hence, these four industries should be omitted from the interaction list.
Then, the industries which support the embodied technology hypothesis are reduced to
chemical and chemical products (three-factor model only), refined petroleum, non-metallic
minerals, electrical and electronic products, and motor vehicles. The industries which
support the notion of induced technical progress are also reduced, to food and beverages and
tobacco (three-factor model only), textiles, wood, paper and publishing, steel and non-ferrous
metals, electrical and electronic products, and other transportation vehicles at the 10 per cent
significance level. Combining the two lists, interaction between productivity growth and
capital input growth are found in nine of the fifteen industries: food, beverages and tobacco,
textiles, wood, paper and publishing, chemical and chemical products, refined petroleum,
non-metallic minerals, steel and non-ferrous metals, electrical and electronic products (both
interactions), motor vehicles, and other transportation vehicles.
Verification of the interaction between capital and productivity growth successfully
explains the reasons for low productivity gains in NIEs, especially in the second stage of
growth driven by capital accumulation. These economies have not yet emerged from the
second stage of development in which capital-related low-level technological change plays a
significant role in growth.
Most growth accountants only emphasise the large role of capital deepening in growth
and interpret this feature as evidence of the unsustainability of growth under the assumption
that capital and technology are independent of each other. However, the assumption is not
empirically verified because capital and technology have interchangeable components.
Interaction between the two means that technology plays a significant role, even in the second
stage of growth, through the technological components of capital accumulation. Thus, the fact
that capital deepening is the largest contributor to growth in NIEs does not necessarily mean
a significant future decline in the growth rate. It simply suggests that these economies
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benefited from the low-level standardised technologies embodied in or induced to imported
capital goods. Interaction between capital accumulation and technological change, combined
with the sequencing of the sources of growth, lead to the insight that technological change is
a major source of growth at any stage of development, in just the way predicted by the
neoclassical growth model.
According to growth accounting methodology, measured productivity growth is equiva-
lent to technological change. This may be not the case; if capital accumulation has a
technological component, measured productivity growth may underestimate the role of
technological change. This is because the intersection contribution of capital and technology
to output growth is attributed solely to capital accumulation. In this sense, growth account-
ing’s decomposition of output growth into inputs and productivity is mechanical.
Output–capital ratio, marginal product of capital, and productivity
growth
A stylised fact made famous by Kaldor is that the output–capital ratio is constant over the
long term. Solow’s version of the neoclassical growth model also predicts that capital grows
at the same rate as output in the steady state. The past experiences of the United States and
other developed countries provide evidence of long-run stability in this ratio (Barro and Sala-
i-Matin 1995). Stability of the output–capital ratio implies that the marginal product of
capital is constant over the long term.
If we suppose a Cobb–Douglas production function, then the average and marginal
product of capital can be expressed as follows:
Y = AKβLα
APK = Y/K = A×(K/L)b
-1
MPK = dY/dK = β×A(K/L)β-1
Inserting the average product of capital into the marginal product, the marginal product of
capital is expressed as equation (7).
(7)  MPK (t) = β(t)×Y/K(t)
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Hence, a stable output–capital ratio directly means a stable marginal product of capital, on
the condition that b is stable over the period, while the decreasing (increasing) output–capital
ratio means decreasing (increasing) marginal product of capital.
The output–capital ratio plays a crucial role in determining not only the level of
marginal product of capital (equation 7) but also productivity growth. Rearranging equation
(1), which calculates productivity growth in terms of growth rates in output, and effective
labour and capital input, we arrive at
g(Y) = vT +  vK g(K) + vL g(L)
where g(Y) = [ln V(T) - ln V(T-1)], g(K) = [ln K(T) - ln K(T-1)], and g(L) = [ln L(T) - ln L(T-1)].
Subtracting labour input growth, g(L), from both sides of the equation and rearranging,
we obtain
(8) g(Y/L) = vT + vK g(K/L) + (vK + vL - 1) g(L)
or g(Y/L) = vT + vK g(K/L),         if vK + vL = 1
where g(Y/L) and g(K/L) are growth rates of labour productivity and capital intensity.
The rate of growth in output per effective labour unit can be expressed by the sum of
the growth rates in the output–capital ratio and the capital–labour ratio, because Y/L = (Y/
K)×(K/L). Inserting this relationship into equation (8) and rearranging, we obtain
(9) vT = g(Y/K) + vL g(K/L) - (vK + vL - 1) g(L)
or vT = g(Y/K) + vL g(K/L),      if vK + vL = 1.
Equation (9) means that productivity growth is the sum of growth of the output–capital ratio
and the contribution growth rate in the capital–labour ratio. There is clear evidence of a
continuous increase in marginal product in fabricated metals and machinery, office machin-
ery and medical/precision instruments, motor vehicles, and other transport vehicles over
time. These industries revealed the highest productivity growth in the growth accounting
study set out in Section 3. In contrast, in textiles, refined petroleum, non-metallic minerals,
iron and steel, and electrical and electronic products there was declining marginal product
of capital. It is noteworthy that these industries showed the lowest productivity growth in the
growth accounting study in Section 3.
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Figure 4 Output–capital ratio at industry level, 1968–90
Note: YKA - food, beverages, tobacco, YKB - textiles, YKC - clothes, leather, YKD -
wood, paper, printing, YKE - chemicals, YKF - refined petroleum, YKG -
rubber, plastic, YKH - non-metallic minerals, YKI - steel, non-ferrous metals,
YKJ - machinery, fabricated metals, YKK - office, medical machinery, YKL -
electrical/electronic products, YKM - motor vehicles, YKN - other vehicles, and
YKO - others.
Source: Author’s calculations.
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The increasing output–capital ratios at the industry level in the Korean manufacturing
sector are a sufficient condition for sustainability of growth. This contradicts Krugman’s
argument that economic growth in the NIEs can be compared to the experience of former
Soviet Russia, which enjoyed high growth driven by capital accumulation but experienced a
significant setback due to decreasing marginal productivity.
Conclusion
Aggregate growth accounting studies find that productivity growth is not an important source
of growth in East Asia. This result leads to the implication that the NIEs will not be able to
sustain growth in the long run, combined with the view that productivity growth is the main
contributor to long-run growth. This paper examined this paradigm.
The initial focus was on disaggregated growth accounting approach. According to the
results, the earlier finding that the contribution of capital to growth is relatively high in the
case of NIEs cannot be denied for Korean manufacturing. However, productivity growth is the
largest contributor to output growth in eight of the fifteen industries, and the contribution of
productivity growth to output growth is not low, at about 37 per cent. The aggregate
production function approach is not acceptable in considering the sum of resource reallocations.
It is quite different from zero.
This led to an examination of the theoretical hypotheses, which explain the puzzle of low
productivity gains and call into question the unsustainability of growth in NIEs. The
empirical results of these hypotheses are as follows. First, the sequencing of sources of growth
was empirically verified (productivity in light industries → capital accumulation in heavy and
petrochemical industries → productivity growth through R&D efforts). Second, interaction
between productivity growth and capital input growth was apparent in nine of the fifteen
industries. Third, an increasing or constant output–capital ratio (marginal product of capital)
was found in ten of the fifteen industries.
Verification of the hypotheses explains the reason for the low productivity gains in
NIEs. These countries have not yet arrived at the third stage of development, where
innovation by R&D investment is the sole means of technological change. Rapid growth in
these economies has been driven by utilising low-level technology, such as technology in a
declining product cycle in labour-intensive light industries and standardised technology
embodied in capital goods in capital-intensive industries. Verification of the hypotheses is
also inconsistent with Krugman’s unsustainability hypothesis derived from low productivity
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gains. His logic is too simplistic. Growth accounting techniques measure productivity growth
as residual under the assumption that technology and capital are independent of each other,
and that productivity growth is identical to innovative technological change. However, these
assumptions are not valid for follower countries. Thus, the intersection contribution of capital
and technology to output growth is mechanically attributed to capital accumulation, under-
estimating the role of technological change. In this way, productivity growth and technologi-
cal change diverge in the case of follower countries.
A crucial component of the logic of sustainability of growth is that disembodied
technological change is the main contributor to long-run growth. This view is generally
accepted in the case of a leader country, which achieves higher productivity growth mainly
by accumulating new knowledge through innovation. However, this study suggests that the
growth process of a follower country is different.
Appendix: Comparison with earlier studies
Earlier growth accounting studies on Korean manufacturing show a wide range of estimates
of productivity growth, from 1.1 per cent to 7.0 per cent. These differences arise from various
factors. First, growth rates in output, capital stock, and labour input differ according to the
data source. For example, growth rates in output and labour in the Mining and Manufactur-
ing Survey are higher than in other sources because it covers only those firms with more than
five workers. It directly increases the estimate of productivity growth. Output growth is about
2.5 -5.1 per cent higher according to Kim and Hong (1992) and Young (1995). Growth rate in
capital stock estimated from the Mining and Manufacturing Survey or the National Wealth
Survey is also higher than the estimate from National Account.
Second, capital stock estimates differ according to the exclusion or inclusion of land and
inventories. Inclusion of land and inventories in estimating capital stock as the case of KDI
dataset decreases its growth rate because growth rates in other types of capital stock,
machinery and non-residential structures, grow faster. In this case productivity growth will
be higher than in the other case. Third, labour input growth rates differ according to the
degree of weighting procedure, and the treatment of self-employed and unpaid family
workers. For example, the KDI labour input index does not weight the input by age–sex
profile, and applied a one-to-one rule in treating self-employed and unpaid family workers.
This would surely decrease labour input growth, and so increase productivity growth.
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Table A1Causality from output growth to capital and productivity growth
                                           Y→TFP Y→K
2-factor model 3-factor model
F stat F stat F stat
(sig. level, %) (sig. level, %)  (sig. level, %)
Food, beverages, tobacco 0.4 (88.2) 0.3 (94.0) 1.2 (39.9))
Textiles 1.0 (45.1) 1.0 (46.0) 1.9 (17.6)
Clothes and leather 1.1 (44.1) 1.4 (27.9) 3.3 (8.1)*
Wood, paper and publishing 0.4 (52.8) 0.4 (52.1) 0.1 (74.7)
Chemical and chemical products 1.9 (18.7) 0.1 (78.2) 1.7 (19.2)
Refined petroleum 3.5 (5.1)* 0.1 (93.9) 0.4 (68.1)
Rubber and plastic 3.7 (3.0)** 4.2 (1.7)** 8.8 (3.0)**
Non-metallic minerals 2.1 (16.1) 2.1 (15.7) 0.3 (57.9)
Steel and non-ferrous metals 0.5 (67.8) 1.0 (43.0) 1.5 (25.6)
Machinery and fabricated metals 5.3 (8.6)* 5.9 (0.6)** 4.0 (1.9)**
Office machinery, medical, precision
instruments 3.9 (2.6)** 18.1 (0.1)** 3.5 (3.6)**
Electrical and electronic products 1.2 (40.0) 1.3 (36.4) 10.6 (0.2)**
Motor vehicles 3.7 (3.1)** 3.8 (2.2)** 2.4 (11.1)
Other transportation vehicles 2.6 (12.2) 2.5 (10.9) 2.0 (15.1)
Other manufacturing 6.6 (1.7)** 9.0 (0.7)** 6.9 (0.5)**
Aggregate                                                                                       2.7 (9.1)* 2.7 (8.8)*
Source: Author’s calculations.
However, the one-to-one rule has an offsetting force by decreasing productivity growth
through lowering the share of labour.
According to Table A2, this study is within the higher productivity group, as noted by
Kim and Park (1988) and Dollar and Sokoloff (1990). In contrast, the other studies show lower
productivity growth (1.1–3.7 per cent). Table A3 finds the causes of difference in productivity
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growth between this study and Young (1995). According to the table, capital stock data in two
studies do not make any difference in calculating productivity growth, even though the growth
rate in Young is 2 percentage points higher, because a higher labour share completely
compensates for the effect of higher capital growth in Young’s study. The labour contribution
growth rate of Young’s study is 1.59 per cent higher than in this study. This difference can
also be decomposed by a difference in weighting of labour (0.58 per cent)13 and differences in
data source (1.01 per cent). However, most of the difference in productivity growth, about 70
per cent (2.04 in 2.95 per cent), is simply a result of the difference in output growth. KDI
output data are estimated from the Input Output Table and the Mining and Manufacturing
Survey, whereas Young uses National Account data.14
Table A2Productivity growth estimates of earlier studies (two-input model,
manufacturing)
Period TFP growth (per cent)
This study 1968–93 5.95
Young (1995) 1966–90 3.0
Pyo et al. (1993) 1970–90 1.1
Moon et al. (1991) 1971–89 3.7
Dollar and Sokoloff (1990) 1953–79 6.1
Kim and Park (1988) 1966–83 7.0
Source: Compiled by the author.
Table A3Productivity growth comparison with Young (1995)
This study Young Difference
(1968–93) (1966–90)
Productivity growth (%) 5.95 3.00 2.95
Output growth (%) 16.14 14.10 2.04 (+)
Capital contribution growth (%) 7.92 7.23 0.69 (-)
Labour contribution growth (%) 2.27 3.86 1.59 (+)
   Capital growth (%) 13.10 15.10 2.00 (+)
   Labour growth (weighted, %) 5.81 7.40 1.59 (+)
   Capital share 0.602 0.479 0.123 (-)
Source: Compiled by the author.
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Notes
1 This directly predicts that we can find no evidence of productivity growth when
decomposing output (Y) growth into input growth, capital (K) and labour (L), and
productivity growth.
2 According to Dollar and Sokoloff (1990), TFP convergence explains 30 per cent of
labour productivity convergence for heavy industry, and 60 per cent for light
industries. In this way, they conclude that TFP convergence occurred.
3 On this point, Dollar finally arrives at the same conclusion as the growth account-
ants.
4 As shown in section 3 (growth accounting studies), capital deepening (increase in K)
explains more than 70 per cent of economic growth in Korean manufacturing in the
period 1978–83. Thus, extending the time span to the early 1980s probably weakens
Dollar’s TFP convergence argument.
5 Strictly speaking, the idea of sequencing has a long tradition. Rostow’s stage theory
and Baumol’s growth analysis are examples.
6 According to Kim and Park (1985), the increase in total employment explains 66 per
cent of the increase in labour input, while the increase in labour hours and quality
change due to enhancement of education each explains about 15 per cent.
7 The contribution growth rate is calculated by multiplying the growth rate in an input
by its share in output.
8 At the third stage, the capital contribution share decreases while the productivity
share increases.
9 Capital stock data are constructed without considering the embodiment effect. So,
the existence of embodied technological change leads to a positive correlation
between capital input growth and productivity growth, as suggested by Wolf (1991).
10 I assume that measured productivity growth is identical to technological change in
this stage. This assumption does not cause a problem in identifying the interactions
between capital growth and technological change because productivity growth
underestimates the role of technology.
11 I performed a bivariate cointegration test using the Johansen procedure for capital
and productivity levels. According to lmax and ltrace tests, there is no cointegrating
factor. So I conclude that there exists no cointegration relation between capital and
productivity level. This result implies that the Granger causality test under a
traditional VAR framework is valid.
12 Optimal lag length is chosen where the Akaike statistic (equation 1) or Schwartz
statistic (equation 2) is minimised.
(1) N log (RSS) + 2K
(2) N log (RSS) + K (log N)
where N is the number of observations, RSS is the residual of squares, and K is the
number of regressors.
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13 Young’s weighting scheme for labour is more stringent than the KDI dataset. He
weights the working population by sex, age, education, industry, income, hours of
work, and class of worker. In contrast, the KDI dataset weights total employment by
education and working hours. However, these different weighting schemes result in
a 0.58 per cent difference of labour input growth.
14 Productivity growth calculations based on National Account data require some
assumptions such as capital share, depreciation rate, the reference period used for
extrapolation, and the beginning of capital accumulation. According to Sarel (1995),
capital share and the specific estimation period results in different productivity
growth in the East Asia. In contrast the Input Output Table does not require strong
assumptions in calculating productivity growth, and allows a disaggregated ap-
proach.
References
Abramovitz, Moses (1986) ‘Catching up, forging ahead, and falling behind’, Journal of
Economic History 46, pp. 385–406.
Barro, Robert J. and Xavier Sala-i-Matin (1995) Economic Growth, New York: McGraw Hill
Press.
Baumol, William J. (1986) ‘Productivity growth, convergence, and welfare: what the long-
run data show’, American Economic Review 76, pp. 103–15.
Bernard, Andrew, and Charles I. Jones (1996a) ‘Productivity across industries and coun-
tries: time series theory and evidence’, Review of Economics and Statistics 78, pp.
135–46.
Collins, Susan, M. (1993) ‘Capital flows to developing countries: implications from the
economies in transition?’, Proceedings of the World Bank Annual Conference on
Development Economics, The World Bank, pp. 349–69.
—— and Barry P. Bosworth (1996) ‘Economic growth in East Asia: accumulation versus
assimilation’, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1996 (2) pp. 135–204.
Denison, Edward F. (1972a) ‘Some issues in productivity analysis: an examination of
estimates by Jorgenson and Griliches’, Survey of Current Business 52(5 part II) pp.
37–62.
—— (1972b) ‘Final comments’, Survey of Current Business 52(5 part II) pp. 95–110.
Dollar, David (1991) ‘Convergence of South Korean productivity on West German levels,
1966–78’, World Development 19, pp. 263–73.
—— and Kenneth Sokoloff (1990) ‘Patterns of productivity growth in South Korean
manufacturing industries, 1963–1979’ Journal of Development Economics 33 pp.
309–27.
Dowrick, Steve (1995) ‘The determinants of long-run growth’, Productivity and Growth,
proceedings of a conference, Reserve Bank of Australia.
—— and Norman Gemmel (1991) ‘Industrialisation, catching up and economic growth: a
comparative study across the world’s capitalist economies’, Economic Journal
101(405) pp. 263–75.
32
Pacific Economic Papers
De Long, Bradford J. and Lawrence H. Summers (1993) ‘How strongly do developing
countries benefit from equipment investment?’, Journal of Monetary Economics 32,
pp. 295–415.
Drysdale, Peter and Yiping Huang (1995) ‘Technological catch-up and economic growth in
East Asia and the Pacific’, Australia–Japan Research Centre seminar paper.
Gerschenkron, Alexander (1962) Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective, Cam-
bridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Hong, Sung-Duk and Jung-Ho Kim (1996) Long-Term Change in Total Factor Productivity
in Korean Manufacture: 1967–93 (in Korean), Seoul: KDI.
—— (1990) ‘Productivity and economic growth’, in Ernst R. Berndt and Jack E. Triplett, eds,
Fifty Years of Economic Measurement: The Fiftieth Jubilee Volume of the Conference
on Research in Income and Wealth, University of Chicago Press.
Hulten, Charles R. (1975) ‘Technical change and reproducibility of capital’, American
Economic Review 65 pp. 956–65.
—— (1979) ‘On the “importance” of productivity change’, American Economic Review 69, pp.
126–36.
—— (1992), ‘Accounting for the wealth of nations: the net versus gross output controversy
and its ramifications’, Scandinavian Journal of Economics 94, Supplement: 9–24.
Jorgenson, Dale W. (1990) ‘Productivity and economic growth’, in Ernst R. Berndt and Jack
E. Triplett, eds, Fifty Years of Economic Measurement: The Fiftieth Jubilee Volume
of the Conference on Research in Income and Wealth, University of Chicago Press.
—— , Frank M. Gollop, and Babara M. Fraumeni (1987) Productivity and U.S. Economic
Growth, Harvard University Press.
Kaldor, N. (1961) ‘Capital accumulation and economic growth’, in F.A. Lutz and D.C. Hague,
eds, Theory of Capital, New York: St. Martin’s Press.
Kalirajan, K.P. and R.T. Shand (1992), ‘Causality between technical and allocative efficiencies:
an empirical testing’, Journal of Economic Studies 19, pp. 3–17.
Kim, Jong-il and Lawrence J. Lau (1994) ‘The sources of economic growth of the East Asian
Newly Industrializing Countries’, Journal of the Japanese and International Econo-
mies 8 pp. 235–71.
Kim, Kwang-Suk and Joon-Kyung Park (1985) Sources of Economic Growth in Korea: 1963–
1982, Seoul: KDI.
—— and S. R. Park (1988) Productivity Changes and Factor Analysis in South Korean
Manufacturing (in Korean), Seoul: Korea Institute of Economics and Technology.
—— and Sung-Duk Hong (1992) Trends and Determinants of Total Factor Productivity in
Korean Manufacturing (in Korean), Seoul: KDI.
Krugman, Paul (1994) ‘The myth of Asia’s miracle’, Foreign Affairs 73(6) pp. 62–78.
Landau, Ralph (1989) ‘Technology and capital formation’, in Dale W. Jorgenson and Ralph
Landau, eds, Technology and Capital Formation, MIT Press.
—— (1992) ‘Technology, capital formation, and U.S. competitiveness’, in International
Productivity and Competitiveness, Bert G. Hickman, ed., Oxford University Press.
Lau, Lawrence J. (1996) ‘The sources of long-term economic growth: observations from the
experience of developed and developing countries’, in Ralph Landau, Timothy Taylor,
and Gavin Wright, eds, The Mosaic of Economic Growth, Stanford University Press.
33
No. 279 May 1998
Previous Pacific Economic Papers
278 Export performance of environmentally sensitive goods: a global perspective
Xinpeng Xu, April 1998
277 Modelling manufactured exports: evidence for Asian newly industrialising
economies
Francis In, Pasquale Sgro and Jai-Hyung Yoon, March 1998
276 Laos in the ASEAN free trade area: trade, revenue and investment implications
Jayant  Menon, February 1998
275 Globalisation
Heinz Arndt, January 1998
274 The WTO and APEC: What role for China?
Stuart Harris, December 1997
273 The APEC air transport schedule
Christopher Findlay, November 1997
272 Japanese foreign direct investment in real estate 1985–1994
Roger Farrell, October 1997
271 China and East Asia trade policy volume 4: Trade reform and
liberalisation in China
Yang Shengming, Zhong Chuanshui, Yongzheng Yang, Feng Lei,
Yiping Huang, and Pei Changhong, September 1997
Nadiri, M. Ishq and Seongjun Kim (1996) ‘R&D, production structure and productivity
growth: a comparison of the US, Japanese, and Korean manufacturing sectors’,
NBER Working Paper 5506.
Pack, Howard (1992) ‘Learning and productivity change in developing countries’, in Gerald
K. Helleinger, eds, Trade Policy, Industrialization and Development: New Perspec-
tives, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
—— (1993) ‘Technology gaps between industrial and developing countries: are there
dividends for latecomers?’, Proceedings of the World Bank Annual Conference on
Development Economics, The World Bank.
Sarel, Michael (1995) ‘Growth in East Asia: what we can and what we cannot infer from it’,
Productivity and Growth, conference proceedings, Reserve Bank of Australia.
Wolff, Edward N. (1991) ‘Capital formation and productivity growth over the long-term’,
American Economic Review 81, pp. 565–79.
Young, Alwyn (1992) ‘A tale of two cities: factor accumulation and technical change in Hong
Kong and Singapore’, NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1992 pp. 13–63.
—— (1994) ‘Lessons from the East Asian NICs: a contrarian view’, European Economic
Review 38, pp. 964–73.
—— (1995) ‘The tyranny of the numbers: confronting the statistical realities of the East
Asian growth experience’, Quarterly Journal of Economics 110 pp. 640–80.
34
Pacific Economic Papers
270 The politics of economic reform in Japan
T.J. Pempel, Tony Warren, Aurelia George Mulgan, Hayden Lesbirel,
Purnendra Jain and Keiko Tabusa, August 1997
269 Diplomatic strategies: the Pacific Islands and Japan
Sandra Tarte, July 1997
268 Interest parity conditions as indicators of financial integration in East Asia
Gordon de Brouwer, June 1997
267 Consensus in conflict: competing conceptual structures and the
changing nature of Japanese politics in the postwar era
Lindy Edwards, May 1997
266 The role of foreign pressure (gaiatsu) in Japan’s agricultural
trade liberalisation
Aurelia George Mulgan, April 1997
265 The transformation in the political economy of China’s economic relations
with Japan in the era of reform
Dong Dong Zhang, March 1997
264 Economic relations across the Strait: interdependence or dependence?
Heather Smith and Stuart Harris, February 1997
263 Has Japan been ‘opening up’?: empirical analytics of trade patterns
Jayant Menon, January 1997
262 Postwar private consumption patterns of Japanese households:
the role of consumer durables
Atsushi Maki, December 1996
261 East Asia and Eastern Europe trade linkages and issues
Jocelyn Horne, November 1996
260 National choice
Wang Gungwu, October 1996
259 Australia’s export performance in East Asia
Peter Drysdale and Weiguo Lu, September 1996
258 Public infrastructure and regional economic development: evidence from China
Weiguo Lu, August 1996
257 Regional variations in diets in Japan
Paul Riethmuller and Ruth Stroppiana, July 1996
256 Japanese FDI in Australia in the 1990s: manufacturing, financial services and
tourism
Stephen Nicholas, David Merrett, Greg Whitwell, William Purcell with Sue
Kimberley, June 1996
35
No. 279 May 1998
255 From Osaka to Subic: APEC’s challenges for 1996
Andrew Elek, May 1996
254 NAFTA, the Americas, AFTA and CER: reinforcement or competition for APEC?
Richard H. Snape, April 1996
253 Changes in East Asian food consumption: some implications for Australian
irrigated agriculture
Philip Taylor and Christopher Findlay, March 1996
252 Behaviour of Pacific energy markets: the case of the coking coal trade with Japan
Richard J. Koerner, February 1996
251 Intra-industry trade and the ASEAN free trade area
Jayant Menon, January 1996
250 China and East Asia trade policy, volume 3:
China and the world trade system
Various authors, December 1995 (special volume)
249 China and East Asia trade policy, volume 2:
Regional economic integration and cooperation
Various authors, November 1995 (special volume)
248 China and East Asia trade policy, volume 1:
East Asia beyond the Uruguay Round
Various authors, October 1995 (special volume)
247 The question of access to the Japanese market
Peter Drysdale, September 1995
246 The Asia factor in US–Japan relations
Urban C. Lehner, August 1995
245 ASEAN’s new role in the Asia Pacific region: can it be a driving force of wider
regional economic cooperation?
Jiro Okamoto, July 1995
244 Dollar shortage — yen shortage?
Heinz W. Arndt, June 1995
243 The dynamics of employment, wages and output: a comparative study of Korea
and Japan
Francis In and Arlene Garces, May 1995
242 On exports and economic growth: further evidence
Ligang Song and Tina Chen, April 1995
241 US trade policy towards the Asia Pacific region in the 1990s
John Kunkel, March 1995
36
Pacific Economic Papers
Annual subscription rate for twelve issues:
Individuals A$60.00
Institutions $A100.00
Cost for single issues:
A$15.00
A$10.00 (Students)
All prices include postage
Available from: Publications Department
Australia–Japan Research Centre
Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies
The Australian National University
Canberra ACT 0200, Australia
Facsimile:  (61 2) 6249 0767
Telephone: (61 2) 6249 3780
Email: ajrcgen@ajrc.anu.edu.au
240 A simple model of main bank monitoring in Japan
Luke Gower, February 1995
239 The impact of economic reform on technical efficiency: a suggested method of
measurement
Peter Drysdale, K. P. Kalirajan and Shiji Zhao, January 1995
238 Price flexibility in Japan, 1970–92: a study of price formation on the distribution
channel
Kenn Ariga and Yasushi Ohkusa, December 1994
237 Political economy of the large-scale retail store law: transforming ‘impediments’ to
entering the Japanese retail industry
Terada Takashi, November 1994
236 A microeconomic model of Japanese enterprise bargaining
Akira Kawaguchi, October 1994
235 Building a multilateral security dialogue in the Pacific
Liu Jiangyong, September 1994
234 Changing patterns of world trade and development: the experience from the 1960s
to the 1980s
Ligang Song, August 1994
